Since e-commerce began with the advent of Interpark, an online shopping mall in 1996, the online shopping environment has grown rapidly and is reorganizing the e-commerce environment. Even after online shopping mall transactions reached 80 trillion won in 2017, the growth rate of online shopping mall transactions has recorded a double-digit increase every year.

As online shopping transactions increase, related consumer damage cases are also increasing. Currently, after consultation with the Consumer Counseling Center of the Korea Consumer Agency, counselors guide how to handle consumer damage and apply for damage relief to the Korea Consumer Agency for cases that are deemed difficult to handle smoothly with the parties. According to the report, applications for online transaction damage relief for "safety issues" and "contract cancellation and subion withdrawal" account for the highest proportion of online platform-related consultations as of 2020. There are requests for legal and institutional maintenance because autonomous agreements on "safety issues" and "contract cancellation and subion withdrawal" are not well reached. Online platform companies that use online platforms for the purpose of "continuing business" and "expanding business scope" are also suffering, claiming damage. As a result of the survey, they responded that they often felt 'burdened' in relation to the size and adequacy of brokerage fees when using them. A majority of respondents said they experienced unfair practices such as fees and transaction procedures, restrictions on the use of other platforms, discriminatory treatment, and unfair demands from platform companies when using online platforms. In response, online platform entry companies are raising the need to establish policies such as "establishment of guidelines for fees and advertising cost increase rates." In order to maintain fairness and sustainability in transactions made through the platform, measures to effectively regulate related damages should be prepared as soon as possible.

Today, online platform companies exercise global economic scale and influence beyond countries. Each country needs to recognize the growth of online platform companies as a driving force for economic growth and foster and develop the capabilities of the digital economy, which is currently concentrated in the United States, China, and developed countries. As a result, many policymakers, companies, and financial experts spared no investment in online platforms and companies before this year's rate hike and economic recession, and showed remarkable capital value gains and investment results in the startup ecosystem represented by Silicon Valley.

The world of platforms we live in plays a role of re-centrifying the public while playing the role of superior commercial intermediaries and bureaucratic administrative control. Platform business models, cloud, big data, the Internet of Things, and artificial intelligence, which are the underlying technologies for building platform ecosystems, are transformative technologies that have deeply changed the political format and architecture of the Internet. Cloud, big data, the Internet of Things, and the recent combination of artificial intelligence technologies, means of production – computing machines, algorithms – are owned by Internet monopolists, changing the decentralized, pluralistic, and democratic political form of the Internet. It also privatizes huge amounts of socially produced data, providing Big Tech with dominant economic status, while giving it the power and independent political and regulatory capabilities of countries and international organizations. In addition, the extraction logic of the platform from an ecological perspective applies not only to digital data but also to other raw materials and basic resources on Earth. Finally, the platform reconstructs the physical space. Artificial intelligence is at the center of combining, realizing, and accelerating these technologies. 

The platform industry is leading meaningful social innovation in addition to job creation by allowing consumers and companies to enjoy great benefits through innovation and competition and investing in R&D. However, the issues of centralization and monopolization behind the huge economic scale of the platform and the advantages of innovation should also be discussed. The platform industry eliminates inter-industry boundaries to increase our daily platform dependence, has exclusive economic status, and on the other hand, platforms that weaken the rights of consumers and workers are located outside the national influence and blur the boundaries of territory. In addition, the platform industry seems to reduce waste by creating risks of privacy, safety and trust, and streamlining resources, but in fact, it plays a role in promoting consumption and increasing asset prices. Accordingly, responses to platform problems are discussed internationally beyond the scope of each country's response, and civil and social responses and alternatives are requested. The response method to the platform problem can take the form of voice (protest and resistance) and exit (departure, withdrawal). The method of protest and resistance refers to collective action such as labor disputes and consumer boycott campaigns, consumer group lawsuits, platform monopoly regulations, digital taxes, personal information protection, or labor-related bills. Deviation from the platform is an alternative way of constructing. It is divided into an alternative to the underlying technology that centralizes the platform and an alternative model to the privatization of data. As another response, there is an alternative to converting such data into a public or community-based model, noting that platform companies privatize current customer data and acquire monopoly status and profits.

How can platform operations be legally regulated? First, it is necessary to look at the legal status of the platform operator. In Article 93 of the Commercial Act, a person who engages in the brokerage of commercial activities between others is called a broker, and the platform operator basically corresponds to such a broker. In general, platform use contracts between platform operators and sellers, and platform operators and consumers include contents related to brokerage contracts. Since brokerage contracts have the nature of delegation, regulations on delegation under civil law apply if there is no special agreement between the parties or there are no special provisions in commercial law. Therefore, the platform operator is a trustee of the seller and consumer, and has the duty of care of a good manager pursuant to Article 681 of the Civil Act. 

Since the platform operator is basically an intermediary, it is not a party to the sales contract between the seller and the consumer and only bears the obligation as an intermediary. However, if the online platform operator does not notify him/her that he/she is only a broker, he/she may be responsible as a seller. In addition, if the product supplied through the online platform is defective and the consumer suffers damage to life, body, and property, the seller who sells the product using the platform can be held contractually liable, such as defect security liability, and the manufacturer can be held responsible for the product.

Major countries are also actively discussing legal regulatory measures for transactions surrounding online platforms. The European Union has a digital service law on general responsibility and duty of care in relation to digital services, and a digital market law with the main content of stipulating prohibitions and obligations for online platforms. In addition, the European Law Institute published an online platform model bill that mainly stipulates the relationship between online platform operators and platform users. Japan prepared a law on improving transparency and fairness of specific digital platforms to prevent enlargement of digital platforms and abuse of power, and to reorganize a system that users can use with confidence. Since there is no legislation governing general e-commerce on the platform, the United States responds to individual issues in individual legal areas, and there is an Oberdorf v. Amazon.com Inc. precedent in which the court recognized the platform operator for product responsibility in relation to the platform's transaction liability.

In Korea, the e-commerce law is established as a law to regulate brokerage transactions through online platforms. Despite frequent revisions, the e-commerce law is uated as not properly reflecting the current e-commerce market as it has only partially supplemented the system. It is also pointed out that the contents of regulations centered on mail order regulations, the form of laws and regulations, and the contents of laws centered on administrative regulations are obstacles to the development of e-commerce, making it difficult for criminals to grasp the contents of the law.

Against this background, in Korea, all amendments to the existing e-commerce law have been proposed several times. The overall legal system proposed by the revised bill reflects the changed transaction structure centered on online platforms, and is a further approach compared to the current e-commerce law, which assumes mail-order sales as a basic transaction method. However, there are limitations in maintaining much of the existing regulations on e-commerce and mail-order sales, and trying to divide and define online platform services in several ways based on various services currently provided.

Discipline on online platforms should be made in the direction of setting transaction rules and principles of responsibility to reflect the changing reality of e-commerce and to be appropriate to protect consumers participating in transactions. It should be noted that regulations in other aspects, such as the Competition Act and the Personal Information Protection Act, are not important or unnecessary. If there is a side that restricts competition or infringes on privacy to the extent that it hinders the net function of e-commerce through online platforms, it is desirable to solve it with separate individual laws. Rather than placing overly detailed and specific regulations on the industry, the E-commerce Act proposes to maintain the principles of contract law for transactions and to have the flexibility to capture multiple transactions to encourage e-commerce to innovate the existing pipeline economy beyond simple brokerage.

Therefore, the e-commerce law should focus on reasonably defining the scope of application and establishing transaction principles rather than trying to overly subdivide transaction types or to cover transaction types that currently exist or are likely to emerge in the future. Rather than trading "goods, etc." it is desirable to regulate the pattern of trading goods, services, and digital contents by reflecting the reality of the transaction. In particular, in the long run, it is necessary to consider a plan to stipulate the contents of digital content, which accounts for a significant portion of platform transactions, in the Electronic Commerce Act, other special laws, or civil laws. In terms of content, the responsibilities as a party to the contract and the responsibilities as an intermediary should be distinguished, and it should be clarified that online platform operators can take external or supplementary responsibilities, and those who create and manage the online platform market should establish order, secure transparency, and make efforts to remedy consumer damage.

The legal situation and legislative policy judgment of major foreign countries are somewhat different, but they have something in common in that they tried to secure transparency through procedural fairness and information provision in relation to the other party that directly deals with the platform operator. The online platform-related bills promoted in the EU and the United States, which have a great influence on Korea, are characterized by regulations targeting very few large platforms. In particular, the EU's platform rules are laws that regulate unfair behavior and trading practices for users, etc. due to their high dependence on platforms, and can be seen as influencing Korea's online platform legislation below.

As such, discussions on regulations caused by the rapid growth of online platforms resulted in the pouring of bills by the relevant committees. When the bill was proposed, a forum was held to listen to the opinions of stakeholders such as industry, law, and government, and research papers were continuously published academically to analyze various issues surrounding the bill and suggest improvement measures. Looking at these preceding studies, the issues regarding the bill are summarized as the issue of the necessity of legislation, the validity of the contents of the legislation, and the issue of regulatory jurisdiction or overlapping regulation. In particular, with the Fair Trade Act, the Terms and Conditions Regulation Act, and the e-commerce law already exist and actual enforcement is actively carried out, it is argued that the Online Platform Act is an unnecessary legislation. They said they proposed the bill by referring to overseas legislative trends such as the EU, the United States, and Japan, but they believe that the legitimacy of enacting special laws should be carefully reviewed and approached overseas because the purpose or legislation is different and the domestic industrial environment is different. Next, when the necessity of the enactment is recognized to a certain extent, there is an opinion that analyzes whether the contents of the regulation are appropriate and suggests improvement measures. In other words, it is a view that reviews problems such as whether there are regulations that are not clear in interpretation, unnecessary or excessive regulations, and whether they are effective, and suggests alternatives. 

If these issues are questions raised in relation to the legislation of regulations, the issue of regulatory jurisdiction or overlapping regulations is an issue that has been sharply opposed between institutions from the beginning of the legislation. When online platform operators are regulated by special laws, regulatory jurisdiction must be unified or regulatory authority must be clearly separated to prevent confusion in legal use and ensure legal stability and predictability for prisoners. However, the Korea Communications Commission's bill originally proposed granted regulatory authority to the Korea Communications Commission for the purpose of protecting users, and the contents were almost similar to the Fair Trade Commission's bill, raising concerns over overlapping regulations. As mentioned earlier, amendments to both bills were submitted by the bill review subcommittee, and through consultations between the party, the Fair Trade Commission and the Korea Communications Commission, respectively, to push for the bill but resolve concerns over overlapping regulations. In other words, the online platform user bill has deleted all overlapping regulations with the Fair Trade Commission bill, and the Fair Trade Commission bill has been revised to adjust the problem of overlapping regulations within the government by stipulating the procedure for consultation with the Minister of Science and ICT or the Korea Communications Commission. However, the current government has put the legislation on hold as it proposed a national task to regulate unfair trade practices in the platform market and come up with self-regulation measures to protect consumers' rights and interests. 

While the current government is pushing and developing self-regulation as a new paradigm for online platform regulation, calls for passing pending related bills as soon as possible with the view that platforms should be actively regulated, such as the EU and Japan. On the other hand, in the field of online platforms, studies are actively being conducted to find access strategies or specific applications such as the direction, model, and promotion system considering the characteristics of the platform. The government seems to be establishing a framework in which the government plays a certain role within the governance of self-regulation by introducing self-regulation in each industry area based on the platform. Therefore, it is necessary to find a model of self-regulation suitable for the current status of the Korean platform market and carefully organize it.

Online platforms are a field in which B2B and B2C are combined, and in particular, it is not easy to develop an effective self-regulation model in Korea because there are few cases of self-regulation in the B2B area. Online platforms consist of three relationships: B2B or P2B between platform operators and platform users (entering companies), B2C between platform users and consumers, and B2C/P2C where self-regulation can be applied. 

Autonomous regulation can theoretically or practically exist in various models, and the following five models can be assumed as models applicable to the field of online platforms in Korea. First, it is a business self-regulation model based on self-regulation at the individual business level and combined with uation by the external self-regulation uation committee. Second, it is an industry self-regulatory model that establishes self-regulation through agreement between stakeholders such as platform operators and platform users at the industry level and establishes a third independent self-regulatory body to monitor and uate self-regulatory implementation. Third, it is a model for legalization of self-regulation, which specifies the legal basis of self-regulation in law. Fourth, it is a model of a legal self-regulatory organization, and the law defines a self-regulatory organization as a legal organization. Fifth, it is a delegated self-regulation model, in which regulations are stipulated in the form of government regulations, but actual enforcement is entrusted by the government to self-regulation organizations, business organizations, and individual platform operators. Since the online platform field includes various industries, a sufficient and in-depth review of which self-regulation model will be applicable and effective is required by considering the actual service type and regulatory area in the online platform field and referring to the existing well-run self-regulation cases or experiences. 

In order to correctly set the direction of self-regulation, the following matters should be considered in terms of the private sector and the government. First, all operators competing in a specific service field of an online platform should be able to participate in self-regulation in a specific service field. In order for self-regulation to work properly, it is essential to establish a cooperative system in which all stakeholders naturally participate and communicate. Second, it is necessary to establish a self-regulatory body that guarantees independence so that all members can accept self-regulation without resistance. In addition, in order for appropriate regulations to be implemented through self-regulatory organizations, a system that collects external uations must be established while allowing various views of market members to be reflected in a timely manner and socially accepted. Third, in order for the self-regulation of online platforms to have practical meaning, measures should be taken to ensure that online platform operators can quickly and fairly resolve disputes with merchants or consumers. They should not use their position to force mediation or arbitration agreements, and should ensure fair procedures. In addition, an atmosphere in the market should be created in which businesses that violate self-regulation can be substantially disadvantaged. Fourth, the disadvantage of self-regulation is that market participants can abuse the purpose of self-regulation as a means of achieving business purposes. Therefore, it is important to ensure that the business strategy of a group of businesses with market power is not adopted for the purpose of self-regulation. In addition, third parties independent of business operators and governments should actively monitor and uate the self-regulation of online platforms to prevent abuse of the purpose of self-regulation or deterioration into a legitimate means to pursue private interests. Fifth, it is necessary to identify and review the current status of regulations on online platforms abroad so that domestic online platforms are not disadvantaged in competition due to self-regulation. Since Korea has a competitive native platform, it is necessary to prevent the result of reducing the competitiveness of domestic online platforms through self-regulation in consideration of this reality. 

The Fair Trade Commission does not explicitly oppose the passage of the online platform fairization bill, but is discussing to come up with a self-regulation plan. It takes a considerable amount of time to review the appropriate self-regulation model and apply it to determine whether it is being implemented well. Therefore, a clearer and more detailed policy direction should be presented so that discussions on self-regulation can be actively progressed and the capacity of self-regulation can be improved. In addition, if there is a need for online platform regulation, discussions on legislation should be continued so that the government can regulate it with a clear legal basis.