In modern capitalism, corporations play an important role in economy and society. As corporations expand their activities in various fields, legal disputes and infringement upon legal interest are increasing. Crimes involved in business activities, such as environmental crimes and economic crimes, cause even more serious damage to legal interest than those committed by individuals. Thus, it is necessary to regulate corporate activities to prevent infringement upon legal interest caused by corporations from the criminological point of view.
This study examines necessity of the punishment for crimes caused by corporations. Firstly, the increase of corporate crimes denotes criminological necessity for it. During the last decade, the number of corporate crimes has increased by over 50 percent. The rate of the increase of corporate crimes is considerably high compared with that of individual crimes that was 23 percent during the same period. This shows the criminological necessity for regulations on corporate activities.
Secondly, the punishment for corporate crimes is indispensible to attain retributive justice. Civil liability like compensation is not an enough sanction against crimes committed by corporations. The punishment should be inflicted on corporations that cause infringement upon legal interest by their criminal acts. It is, of course, necessary to consider the difference between an individual and a corporate body to mete out appropriate punishments for corporate crimes.
Thirdly, preventative effects can be expected through the punishment for corporate crimes. Though deterrence is one of important functions of the punishment, current punishments focused on individual crimes are not effective deterrence against corporate crimes. In most cases, fines are imposed upon corporations that commit crimes in accordance with the article of bilateral punishment. However, fines are not sufficient, considering damage caused by corporations and their financial size.
Fourthly, it is difficult to specify wrongdoers in corporate crimes. Each member in corporations performs limited duties since modern organization of corporations is very systemized and divided. It is possible that no member of a corporation is punished for corporate crimes though the whole society suffers from damage caused by its criminal acts.
Fifthly, damage caused by corporate crimes results from not only their members, but also corporations themselves - poor control systems, defects of organization, and so forth. It is unjust to punish members inside corporations for infringement upon legal interest that results from the defective structures of corporations. Corporations themselves should assume liability for it.
Lastly, it is true that there is a limit to punishment for corporate crimes. However, civil or administrative sanctions are less effective ways for regulating corporate activities. Corporations can easily shift their liability onto consumers by including cost for civil sanctions in prime cost. It is consumers that pay compensation for damage caused by corporations in the end. It is said that administrative sanctions are more effective than civil sanctions to regulate corporate activities. However, administrative authorities tend to be reluctant to impose administrative sanctions on corporations since they are concerned about economic and social impact caused by administrative sanctions.
All things considered, criminal sanctions are most effective methods to regulate corporal activities from the viewpoint of criminology. Corporations, however, shall not assume criminal liability unless a corporate body’s criminal ability is admitted. In Korea, corporate crimes are punished not by the Criminal Law, but by the article of bilateral punishment in special laws for practical necessity. It is contradictory that corporations that do not have criminal ability should assume criminal liability.

This paper examines a corporate body’s criminal ability in order to seek desirable methods for resolving discrepancy found in criminal sanctions against corporate crimes. A corporate body’s legal ability to act is the premise of its criminal liability and is based upon the concept of behavior. According to the theory of social behavior that is prent in Korea, the definition of behavior is a socially meaningful human conduct that is governed or governable by human being’s will. Like an individual, a corporate body can do socially meaningful work that is governed by the will of its organization or its members. Thus, a corporation’s behavior can be identified as the behavior of its organization or its members. In this sense, a corporation can have the legal ability to act.
Some deny a corporate body’s criminal ability because it has neither mentality nor organs to realize its will. A corporate body, however, conducts its social activities and makes decisions through its internal organization. A corporate body’s behavior is distinguished from its members’ behavior and its will is independent of its members’ will. A corporate body’s behavior is decided through the process similar to human being’s decision process. Thus, the process that leads a corporate body to a criminal act is culpable. In spite of its legal characteristics different from an individual, we can admit a corporate body’s legal ability to act and criminal ability. A corporate body that acts legally like an individual is culpable for its criminal acts.
This paper also examines various sorts of criminal sanctions to suggest a model case for legislation to punish corporate crimes. The common law countries where corporations have conducted frenetic activities have accumulated judicial precedents and common law theories for corporate crimes. The Unite Kingdom has developed the theory of Identification Doctrine that a corporate body shall be liable for the behavior of its representatives and senior managers that can be identified as the corporate body itself. The United States has formulated the theory of Vicarious Liability that a corporate body shall be liable for the behavior of all its employees under specific conditions. Civil law countries, such as France and Switzerland, admit a corporate body’s criminal ability and stipulate articles on punishing corporate crimes in the Criminal Law.

This paper suggests four measures to impose criminal liability on corporations. Firstly, without admitting a corporate body’s criminal ability, we can levy fines on corporations for their misdemeanor. Secondly, without admitting a corporate body’s criminal ability, we can punish corporations in accordance with the article of bilateral punishment in special laws. Thirdly, without new legislation, we can admit a corporate body’s criminal ability and interpret the Criminal Law for punishing corporate crimes. Lastly, we can admit a corporate body’s criminal ability and adopt new legislation on corporate crimes.

It is most desirable measure to stipulate new articles on corporate crimes in the Criminal Law. New articles can be corroborated by criminal theories on a corporate body. Criminal acts of a corporate body’s representatives, senior managers should be identified as the corporate body’s acts. Illegal decisions of board of directors are culpable as a corporate body’s decisions. A corporate body should assume liability for neglecting supervising its employees if they committed criminal acts. A corporate body should also assume liability for infringement upon legal interest caused by its defective system.
Like legislation of France and Switzerland, it is necessary to stipulate articles on corporate crimes in the Criminal Law and define accurately the concept of a corporation, its organization whose behavior can be identified as its behavior, and requirements of corporate crimes. We also need to introduce alternative criminal sanctions such as a business suspension in addition to fines.

Key words : corporate crimes, punishment for corporations, a corporate body’s criminal liability, a corporate body’s legal ability to act